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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a simple scheme designed to elicit and reward intensity of preferences in
referenda: voters faced with a number of binary proposals are given one regular vote for each
proposal plus an additional number of bonus votes to cast as desired. Decisions are taken according
to the majority of votes cast. In our base case, where there is no systematic difference between
proposals' supporters and opponents, there is always a positive number of bonus votes such that ex
ante utility is increased by the scheme, relative to simple majority voting. When the distributions of
valuations of supporters and opponents differ, the improvement in efficiency is guaranteed only if
the distributions can be ranked according to first order stochastic dominance. If they are, however,
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Abstract
This paper proposes a simple scheme designed to elicit and reward in-
tensity of preferences in referenda: voters faced with a number of binary
proposals are given one regular vote for each proposal plus an additional
number of bonus votes to cast as desired. Decisions are taken according to
the majority of votes cast. In our base case, where there is no systematic
di⁄erence between proposals￿supporters and opponents, there is always
a positive number of bonus votes such that ex ante utility is increased by
the scheme, relative to simple majority voting. When the distributions
of valuations of supporters and opponents di⁄er, the improvement in ef-
￿ciency is guaranteed only if the distributions can be ranked according
to ￿rst order stochastic dominance. If they are, however, the existence of
welfare gains is independent of the exact number of bonus votes.
1 Introduction
In binary decisions￿ when a proposal can either pass or fail￿ majority voting
performs rather well. In fact, it has only one obvious drawback: it fails to
account for the intensity of preferences. It is this failing that leads to several
related problems: the blocking of proposals that would increase conventional
measures of social welfare, and the related need to pretect minorities from the
worst abuses; the temptation to recur to log-rolling in committees, and the
resulting lack of transparency. It is natural to ask then whether a voting system
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1as simple as majority voting but rewarding intense preferences could be designed
for binary decisions.
The functioning of prices in a market o⁄ers some inspiration: prices elicit
consumers￿intensity of preferences by di⁄erentiating across goods and function-
ing in tandem with a budget constraint. The budget constraint plays a central
role and suggests an immediate idea: suppose voters were given a stock of votes,
and asked to allocate them as they see ￿t over a series of binary proposals, each
of which would then be decided on the basis of the majority of votes cast. Would
voters be led to cast more votes over those issues to which they attach more im-
portance? And would the ￿nal result then be an expected welfare gain, relative
to simple majority voting, as the probability of winning a vote shifts for each
voter from issues of relatively less importance towards issues of relatively more
importance? We have proposed a voting system of this type￿ storable votes￿
in two recent papers (Casella, 2002, and Casella, Gelman and Palfrey 2003).1
The simple intuition proves correct: both in theory and in experiments subjects
cast more votes when the intensity of their preferences is higher. The e¢ ciency
gains are also borne out: both in theory and in the experiments, ex ante utility
is typically higher with storable votes (although some counterexamples exist).
A particularly clear example is the application of these ideas to referenda2.
Referenda are important in practice because they are commonly and increas-
ingly used,3 and are attractive in theory because the large population of voters
eliminates most of the strategic considerations that complicate the analysis of
voting choices in committees. In addition, referenda are often submitted to vot-
ers in bundles￿ think of a set of propositions on a California ballot, or indeed
in many US states and European countries. Consider then a voting mechanism
where voters are faced with a number of contemporaneous, unrelated referenda,
and are asked to cast one vote on each referendum but in addition are given a
number of "bonus votes" to cast as desired over the di⁄erent referenda. Each
referendum is then decided according to the majority of the votes. Does the
addition of the bonus votes allow voters to express the intensity of their pref-
erences and increase their ex ante welfare, relative to simple majority voting?
This is the question studied in this paper.
We ￿nd that the answer is positive if the number of bonus votes is chosen
correctly. Intuitively, the bonus votes give voters the possibility to target the
single issue that is most important to them (in equilibrium the bonus votes are
1Storable votes apply to series of binary decisions taken over time. Hortala-Vallve (2004)
has proposed a similar system in a simultaneous voting game with two voters and two binary
decisions.
2We use the term "referenda" to indicate any proposition decided by popular majority
voting, whether initiated by the government (referenda in the proper sense) or by the people
(initiatives).
3Gerber (1999), Matsusaka (2004), the Inititative and Referendum Institute at
www.iandrinstitute.org, and the Direct Democracy Institute at www.c2d.unige.ch provide
a wealth of information on the history and practice of direct democracy around the world.
Referenda are now used in many democracies (in Switzerland, of course, but also in the US,
the European Union, Australia, and other countries), and their number is rising (in US states,
for example, the number of referenda has increased in every decade since 1970, at an average
rate of seventy per cent per decade).
2never split), but at the cost of more uncertainty over the other proposals. In
our base case, where for any proposal there is no systematic di⁄erence between
the distribution of valuations of proponents and opponents, the result is clean:
if the edge between the representative voter￿ s highest expected valuation and
his mean valuation over all proposals is large, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates, and
the number of bonus votes should be large; if on the other hand such an edge
is small, the number of bonus votes should be correspondingly small. But the
number should not be zero: for all distributions of valuations there is a positive
number of bonus votes such that ex ante welfare rises, relative to simple majority
voting.
After having presented our analysis in the simplest setting, we discuss two
natural questions on the design of the mechanism. Should the bonus votes be
perfectly divisible, as opposed to being a discrete number, allowing voters to ￿ne-
tune the ranking of the di⁄erent referenda? Should the bonus votes be negative,
as opposed to positive, granting voters the power to cast "partial votes," weaker
votes relative to the regular ones? We show that generalizing the scheme to
admit these possibilities is not di¢ cult, but the resulting design has less intuitive
appeal. The increase in complexity is not matched by a corresponding increase
in e¢ ciency.
The theoretical result of our base case is clean and robust. The di¢ culty lies
in quantifying the importance of the welfare gain. Symmetrical distributions of
valuations between supporters and opponents of any given proposal make the
analysis manageable and are commonly assumed in the literature, but constrain
the problem severely: a direct implication of the results in Ledyard and Palfrey
(2002) is that with symmetrical distributions our bonus votes mechanism, simple
majority voting, and random decision making all are asymptotically e¢ cient.
The positive welfare gain associated with bonus votes becomes vanishingly small
in the limit, as the population approaches in￿nity. (Of course the same can be
said of majority voting over random decision making.) Introducing asymmetries
is then important, but their choice can be arbitrary. In a thorough empirical
analysis of more than 800 ballot propositions in California from 1912 through
1989, Matsusaka (1992) identi￿es an equally split electorate as characteristic
of propositions submitted to popular vote (as opposed to being decided by the
legislature). Anchoring our model with this observation, we assume that the
population is equally split on all proposals, but mean intensity is higher on one
side. In this case, bonus votes are guaranteed to increase ex ante utility if the
distribution of valuations on the side with higher mean ￿rst-order stochastically
dominates the distribution on the opposite side; that is, if the mass of voters
with more intense preferences is larger on the side with higher mean. When
this su¢ cient condition is satis￿ed, the superiority of bonus votes over majority
voting holds independently of the exact number of bonus votes and remains true
asymptotically (whereas majority voting again converges to random decision-
making). First order stochastic dominance is a su¢ cient condition for robust
welfare gains, but our numerical exercises suggest that the result is more general:
especially when the number of referenda is not large, counterexamples where
simple majority voting is superior are not easy to construct.
3It is this more general case of asymmetric distributions that better captures
the basic intuition for bonus votes discussed earlier.4 If voters are equally split
on a proposal, e¢ ciency demands that the side with the higher intensity of
preferences prevails; and if the voters are not equally split, a strongly a⁄ected
minority should at time prevail over a less a⁄ected majority. This is the outcome
that bonus votes can deliver. Notice that the conclusion need not involve inter-
personal comparisons of utility: in the ex ante evaluation, at a constitutional
stage taking place before speci￿c ballots are realized, all voters are identical and
the representative voter weighs the probabilities of his yet unrevealed valuations.
But is the need for stronger minority representation a real need in practice?
Anecdotal reports abound on the distorting e⁄ects of money in direct democracy,
and more precisely on the disproportionate power of narrow business interests.5
Is there room for a voting scheme that is designed to increase further the power
of minorities? Perhaps surprisingly, the informed answer seems to be yes. Ger-
ber (1999) and Matsusaka (2004) provide exhaustive empirical analyses of direct
democracy in US states, where money spent in referenda campaigns is largest
and unlimited. Although their emphasis di⁄ers, they both conclude that there
is no evidence that business interests are succeeding at manipulating the process
in their favor any more than grass-root citizens￿groups (or, according to Mat-
susaka, away from the wishes of the majority). In fact both books isolate the
need to protect minorities, stripped of the checks and balances of representative
democracy and of the pragmatic recourse to log-rolling, as the most urgent task
in improving the process.6
The protection of minorities is the heart of the existing voting system that
most closely resembles the mechanism described here. "Cumulative voting"
applies to a single multi-candidate election and grants each voter a number of
votes equal to the number of positions to be ￿lled, with the proviso that the
votes can either be spread or cumulated on as few of the candidates as desired.
The system has been advocated as an e⁄ective protection of minority rights
(Guinier, 1994) and has been recommended by the courts as redress to violations
of fair representation in local elections (Issacharo⁄, Karlan and Pildes, 2001).
There is some evidence, theoretical (Cox, 1990), empirical (Bowler, Donovan
and Brockington, 2003), and experimental (Gerber, Morton and Rietz, 1998)
that cumulative voting does indeed work in the direction intended. The bonus
votes scheme discussed in this paper di⁄ers because it applies to a series of
4The asymmetry of the distribution seems natural when talking informally, but is di¢ cult
to justify in analyses based on a single referendum. The approach posits cardinal valuations,
but on what basis can one side claim a larger mean valuation than the other? A normalization,
a reference criterion, is required. Studying multiple proposals contemporaneously provides
such a reference.
5See, for example, Broder (2000), with the expressive title Democracy Derailed. Opposite
views on the promise of direct democracy, held with equal strength, are also common: see for
exampleThe Economist, Dec 21, 1996 ("The idea that people should govern themselves can
at last mean just that") or The Economist, Jan 23, 2003.
6Even if their conclusion were incorrect, a priori it is unclear how granting bonus votes
would interact with the existence of special interests and their di⁄erential access to campaign
money.
4independent decisions, each of which can either pass or fail, but the intuition
inspiring it is similar.
The idea of eliciting preferences by linking independent decisions through a
common budget constraint can be exploited quite generally, as shown by Jackson
and Sonnenschein (2003). Their paper proposes a speci￿c mechanism that allows
individuals to assign di⁄erent priority to di⁄erent actions while constraining
their choices in a tighly speci￿ed manner. The mechanism converges to the ￿rst
best allocation as the number of decisions grows large, but the design of the
correct menu of choices o⁄ered to the agents is complex, and the informational
demands on the planner severe￿ the ￿rst best result comes at the cost of the
mechanism￿ s complexity. The recourse to bonus votes in referenda that we
discuss in the present paper builds on the same principle but with a somewhat
di⁄erent goal: a mechanism with desirable if not fully optimal properties that
is simple enough to be put in practice. It is this simplicity that we particularly
value: we hope that the reader will keep in mind that we propose and study a
minor, plausible modi￿cation to existing voting practices.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model; sections 3
and 4 establish the ￿rst result and discuss its intuition in the simplest setting,
when the distributions of valuations are identical across individuals and propos-
als, and are symmetrical between opponents and supporters of each proposal.
Section 5 extends the analysis to the case where distributions di⁄er across pro-
posals. Sections 6 and 7 study possible extensions of the mechanism￿ should
the bonus votes be a continuous variable, as opposed to a discrete number?
Should the extra votes be positive or should they instead be negative, mimick-
ing "limited voting" in multi-candidate elections where voters have fewer votes
than the number of open positions? Section 8 addresses the case of asymmet-
ric distributions, and section 9 concludes. The Appendix contains some of the
proofs.
2 The Basic model
A large number n of voters are asked to vote, contemporaneously, on a set of k
unrelated proposals (with k > 1). Each proposal can either pass or fail, and we
will refer to each vote as an unrelated referendum. Each voter is asked to cast
one vote in each referendum, but in addition is given a set of m bonus votes.
It is natural to think of each bonus vote as equivalent to one regular vote, but
we can suppose, more generally, that each bonus vote is worth # regular votes,
with # > 0. For example, imagine regular votes as green, and bonus votes as
blue; if # = 1=2, it takes 2 blue votes to counter 1 green vote, and viceversa
if # = 2. The parameter # can take any value between 1=C and C, where C
is an integer, small relative to n but otherwise arbitrary. We denote by ￿ the
aggregate value of all bonus votes: ￿ ￿ m#.7
7The set-up generalizes trivially to the case where di⁄erent bonus votes are allowed to have
di⁄erent values, relative to regular votes. As we shall see, the only important parameter is
the aggregate value ￿.
5The valuation that voter i attaches to proposal r is summarized by vir. A
negative valuation indicates that an individual is against the proposal, while
a positive valuation indicates that he or she is in favor, and the valuation￿ s
absolute value, which we denote by vir, summarizes the intensity of i￿ s prefer-
ences: voter i￿ s payo⁄ from proposal r is vir if the referendum is resolved in his
preferred direction, and 0 otherwise. Individual valuations are drawn, indipen-
dently across individuals and across proposals from probability distributions
Fr(v) that can vary across proposals but are common knowledge and have full
support normalized to [￿1;1]. In our basic model, we maintain the traditional
assumption that the distributions Fr(v) are symmetrical around 0: there is no
systematic di⁄erence between voters who oppose and voters who favor any pro-
posal. We will come back to this assumption later. Each individual knows his
own valuation over each proposal, but only the probability distribution of the
others￿valuations. There is no cost of voting.8
We concentrate on symmetric equilibria where, conditional on their set of
valuations, all voters select the same optimal strategy￿ a restriction that will
allow us to make use of standard limit theorems even in our case of discrete
votes. In addition, we select equilibria where voters do not use weakly dominated
strategies. Since there can be no gain from voting against one￿ s preferences, in
these equilibria voters vote sincerely. The only decision is the number of votes
xr to cast in each referendum, where we use the convention that negative votes
are votes cast against a proposal and positive votes are votes cast in favor. Voter
i￿ s strategy is then indicated by xir(vir;m;#;Fr).
We will characterize the Bayesian equilibrium of the game. But before doing
so, it is helpful to establish some preliminary results.
3 Three preliminary results
We show in this section that the number of candidate equilibria can be dras-
tically reduced by three observations, summarized here as lemmas. All three
lemmas are proved in the Appendix, but the intuitions behind them can be
described simply.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, xir(vir;m;#;Fr) = ￿xir(￿vir;m;#;Fr) 8i, 8r:
for all voters and in all referenda the number of votes cast is independent of the
sign of the voter￿ s valuation.
Voters spend their bonus votes on referenda where they expect the rest of
the electorate to be equally split, and in this case the number of votes cast is
independent of whether the voter favors the proposal or opposes it. The only
complication could occur if all referenda were expected to be won by one side
with probability close to 1. But then undominated strategies imply that voters
8Introducing voting costs would be easier in a probabilistic model of voting (as in Campbell
(1999)), but should not have qualitative e⁄ects on our results as long as the distribution of
costs and the distributions of valuations are independent (see the discussion of Ledyard (1984)
in the conclusions of Campbell (1999)).
6would act as if they had a positive probability of being pivotal, i.e. as if the rest
of the electorate were equally split, replicating the conclusion above (and in fact
ensuring, with Fr(v) symmetrical around 0, that the outcome of all referenda
must be uncertain).
One implication of Lemma 1 is that we can simplify our notation. As long
as the distributions Fr(v) are symmetric, we can work with distributions Gr(v)
de￿ned over absolute valuations and support [0;1]; and we will understand the
strategies xir(vir;m;#;Fr) to refer to the absolute number of votes cast.
Lemma 2. In all equilibria with weakly undominated strategies, voters cu-
mulate their bonus votes on one referendum. All equilibria are equilibria of the
simpler game where a single bonus vote of value ￿ is granted to all voters.
In all referenda, the asymptotic distribution of votes is such that the proba-
bility of being pivotal is approximately proportional to the number of votes cast
(see the Appendix). The implication is that the problem faced by a voter when
choosing how to allocate bonus votes is linear in the number of votes and has a
corner solution: all bonus votes should be cumulated on one proposal.
Lemma 2 allows us to simplify the problem drastically. We can model the
menu of bonus votes as a single bonus vote of value ￿ and reduce the voters￿
problem to the choice of the single referendum in which the bonus vote will be
cast. From a practical point of view, granting a single bonus vote seems a prefer-
able design: it simpli￿es the voters￿problem and has no e⁄ect in equilibrium.
For the remainder of the paper, we will then refer to a single bonus vote.
Call ￿r the share of voters expected to cast their bonus vote in referendum
r, where
Pk
r=1 ￿r = 1. If all voters were expected to cast their bonus vote in
the same referendum r0, all referenda would be decided by a simple majority of
voters, as if no bonus votes were granted. We show in the Appendix that with
probability arbitrarily close to 1 a fraction of the population would then prefer
to withdraw its bonus vote from r0. It follows that in equilibrium ￿r < 1 for all
r. We can then establish:
Lemma 3. Call pr the probability that voter i obtains his or her desired
outcome in referendum r when casting a regular vote only, and p￿r the corre-


































8r 6= s (2)
7The probabilities result from the application of the local limit theorem and
are valid up to an approximation of order O(n￿3=2) (see the Appendix). Voter
i will choose to cast his or her bonus vote in referendum s over referendum r if
and only if visp￿s + virpr > virp￿r + visps. Substituting (1), we obtain (2). If
(2) holds for all r￿ s di⁄erent from s, then the voter will cast the extra vote on
referendum s.
We are now ready to characterize the equilibria, and we begin by the simpler
case where Gr(v) = G(v) for all r.
4 Identical distributions
When the distributions of valuations are identical across proposals, intuition
suggests a simple strategy: let each voter cast the bonus vote in the referendum
to which he or she attaches the highest valuation. Indeed we can show:
Proposition 1. If Gr(v) = G(v) 8r, then there exists a unique equilibrium
where each voter casts the bonus vote in referendum s if and only if vis ￿ vir
8r.
Proof of Proposition 1. Given Lemma 3, the proof of proposition 1
is straightforward. (i) To see that the candidate strategy is indeed an equi-
librium strategy, suppose all voters but i cast their bonus vote in the refer-
endum with highest absolute valuation. Since all valuations are drawn from
the same probability distribution, with k draws each has probability 1=k of
being the highest, implying ￿s = ￿r = 1=k 8r. Thus the square root in
(2) equals 1 and by Lemma 3 voter i should follow the same strategy, es-
tablishing that it is indeed an equilibrium. (ii) To see that the equilibrium
is unique, suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium where not all
￿r￿ s are equal, and call s the referendum such that ￿s = maxf￿rg. Then q
[1 + ￿s(￿
2 + 2￿)]=[1 + ￿r(￿
2 + 2￿)] ￿ ￿(s;r) ￿ 1 8r, with at least one strict
inequality. Call r0 one of the referenda for which the strict inequality holds (at
least one r0 must exist). Then, by (1), in the bilateral comparison between s
and r0 the expected share of voters casting their bonus vote on s is lower than
on r0. We can have ￿s = maxf￿rg only if there exists at least one r00 such that
￿(s;r00) < ￿(r0;r00). But this requires ￿r0 > ￿s, contradicting ￿s = maxf￿rg.
￿
In our opinion, both the uniqueness of the equilibrium strategy and its sim-
plicity are strong assets of the mechanism. The immediate response to being
allowed to cast a bonus vote is to cast it over the issue that matters most.
It seems to us important in practice that the best strategy associated with a
mechanism be both sincere and simple, and that voters￿concerns with strategic
calculations be limited to a minimum.
To evaluate the potential for welfare gains, we use as criterion ex ante e¢ -
ciency: the expected utility of a voter before having drawn his or her valuations
8(or equivalently before being informed of the exact slate of proposals on the
ballot). By Proposition 1, the expected share of voters casting their bonus vote
is equal in all referenda (￿r = 1=k 8r), impliying, by (1), that the probability of
obtaining the desired outcome depends on whether the bonus vote is cast, but
not on the speci￿c referendum: pr = p, p￿r = p￿ 8r. Denote by Ev the expected
absolute valuation over any proposal, and by Ev(j) the expected jth order sta-
tistics among each individual￿ s k absolute valuations (where therefore Ev(k) is
the expected value of each voter￿ s highest absolute valuation). Since voters
cast their bonus vote in the referendum associated with the highest valuation,
expected ex ante utility EU is given by:
EU = Ev(k)p￿ +
k￿1 X
j=1
Ev(j)p = k(Ev)p + Ev(k)(p￿ ￿ p): (3)






















Our reference is expected ex ante utility with a series of simple majority












again ignoring terms of order O(n￿3=2). Comparing (4) and (5), we see that
both mechanisms dominate randomness (where each proposal is resolved in ei-
ther direction with probability 1=2), although, in line with the arguments in
Ledyard and Palfrey (2002) both converge to randomness, and to each other,
as the population approaches in￿nity (a point we will discuss in more detail
later). Thus a plausible scaling of e¢ ciency is the relative improvement of the
two mechanisms over randomness. Calling ER expected utility with random







We will state that the voting mechanism improves e¢ ciency over a series of
simple majority referenda if ! > 1.









9Equation (7) holds for any large n, including in the limit as n approaches in￿nity.
9Proposition 2. For any distribution G(v) and any number of referenda
k > 1, there exists a ￿ > 0 such that ! > 1 for all ￿ < ￿.






8￿ > 0 if (Ev(k))2 ￿ k(Ev)2
8￿ <
2kEv(Ev(k)￿Ev)
k(Ev)2￿(Ev(k))2 if (Ev(k))2 < k(Ev)2:
(8)
Given a speci￿c distribution, the admissible range of ￿ values is easily pinned
down. Suppose for example that G(v) is the uniform distribution; then Ev =
1=2 and Ev(k) = k=(k + 1), implying that e¢ ciency improves for all ￿ < 2(k +
1)=(k￿1). If k = 2, the constraint is ￿ < 6￿ the bonus vote cannot count more
than 6 regular votes; if k = 5, the constraint is ￿ < 3, and so forth. Because
the ceiling on ￿ is declining in k, its limit as k approaches in￿nity provides
a su¢ cient condition for e¢ ciency gains: for any number of referenda, ￿ < 2
guarantees ! > 1.
In fact we can do more: from (7) we can derive the optimal ￿, the value of








If G(v) is a uniform distribution, then ￿
￿ = 1 for any value of k: regardless
of the number of referenda, the optimal value of the bonus vote is 1￿ that is, the
bonus vote should be equivalent to a regular vote. At ￿ = 1 and for a unifrom
G(v), ! =
p
k(3 + k)=(1 + k), always larger than 1, but maximal at k￿ = 3:
given the optimal choice of ￿, the number of contemporaneous referenda that
maximizes e¢ ciency gains is 3. At these parameter values, the welfare gain
relative to simple majority, as de￿ned by !, is 6 percent.
There results, so surprisingly clean, extend easily to a general power distri-
bution, and we summarize them in the following example:
Example 1. Suppose that G(v) can be parameterized as a power distribu-
tion: G(v) = vb, b > 0. Then, ignoring integer constraints: (i) For all k, ! > 1
if ￿ < 2=b. (ii) For all k, ￿
￿ = 1=b. (iii) If ￿ = ￿
￿, k￿ = 2 + 1=b.
The parameter b determines the shape of the distribution, reducing to the
uniform if b = 1. If b < 1, G(v) is unimodal at 0, and the mass of voters
declines monotonically as the valuations become more extreme; with b > 1,
on the contrary, the distribution is unimodal at 1, the upper boundary of the
support, and the mass of voters increases with the intensity of the valuations.




















Figure 1: Power distributions: histograms. Shares of the electorate with valu-
ations in the ￿rst, second, third and fourth quarter of the support for di⁄erent
values of the b parameter.
is bk=(bk + 1). For a more intuitive understanding of what the distribution
implies, suppose for example that voters were asked to rank an issue as "not
important," "somewhat important," "important," or "very important," and that
these labels corresponded to a partition of the range of possible intensities into
4 intervals of equal size, from [0;0:25] to [0:75;1]. For a uniform distribution of
valuations, a quarter of the voters would choose each interval; with b = 1=2, half
of the voters would classify the issue as "not important" and about 13 percent
as "very important"; with b = 2, the percentages become 6 percent for "not
important" and close to 45 percent for "very important" (see Figure 1). With a
power distribution, the parameter b is a measure of the saliency of the issue: the
higher is b, the higher the share of voters who feel strongly about the proposal.
The more salient the set of issues, the smaller is the optimal value of the bonus
vote: with b = 1=2, the bonus vote should count as 2 regular votes; with b = 2
as half, and with b = 3 as a third.
The su¢ cient condition (i) above is important. Without precise knowledge
of the distribution, a policy-maker cannot set the optimal value of the bonus
vote, but if the more modest goal of some improvement over simple majority is
acceptable, this can be achieved by choosing a conservatively small ￿. Consider
for example setting ￿ = 1=2￿ then, for all k, e¢ ciency gains are achieved as long
as b < 4. With b = 4, almost 70 percent of the voters consider the issue "very
important," more than 90 percent either "important" or "very important" and
less than 1 percent "not important." As long as saliency is not higher, welfare
11is improved by the bonus vote.
Why is there a ceiling on the acceptable values of the bonus vote? And why
does this ceiling depend on the shape of the distribution? Taking ￿ as given, we
can rewrite the necessary condition for e¢ ciency gains as:















A > 1 8￿ > 0: (10)
Condition (10) makes clear that an improvement in e¢ ciency requires a suf-
￿cient wedge between the mean valuation and the highest expected valuation
draw. The problem is that the introduction of the bonus vote creates noise
and redistributes the probability of winning towards the referendum where the
bonus vote is utilized but away from the others. E¢ ciency can increase only if
the higher probability of being on the winning side is enjoyed over a decision
that really matters to the voter, a decision that matters enough to compensate
for the decline in in￿ uence in the other referenda. Predictably, the required
wedge is increasing in ￿: the higher the value of the bonus vote, the larger
the noise in the votes distribution and the larger the shift in the probability of
winning towards the referendum judged most important. Equations (1) show
this e⁄ect very clearly. Similarly, the wedge is increasing in k: the larger is k,
the more issues over which the probability of winning declines (k￿1), and thus
again the larger must be the valuation attached to the referendum over which
the bonus vote is spent.11
For our purposes, the ratio Ev(k)=Ev summarizes all that matters about
the distribution of valuations. With a power distribution the ratio equals (k +
bk)=(1+bk), an expression that is declining in b: the more salient the issues￿ the
higher b￿ the smaller the expected di⁄erence between the highest draw and the
mean valuation, and the smaller must then ￿ be if (10) is to be satis￿ed. Hence
the result described above. More generally, given Ev(k)=Ev and k, condition
(8) speci￿es the constraint on ￿ and (9) ￿￿ s optimal value.12
Summarizing, the voting scheme exploits the variation in valuations to ensure
that the added noise created by the bonus vote is compensated by a higher
probability of winning a decision that really matters. The more intense the
average valuations￿ the more polarized the society￿ the higher the variance
must be for a given value of the bonus vote, or equivalently, the smaller must
be the value of the bonus vote; the less intense the average valuations, the lower
the required variance or equivalently the higher the optimal value of the bonus
vote.13
11But Ev(k) is also increasing in k. Whether ful￿lling (10) becomes more or less di¢ cult as
k increases depends on the distribution.
12It was tempting to conjecture a link between the ordering of distributions in terms of
the ratio Ev(k)=Ev and ￿rst-order stochastic dominance￿ until Russell Davidson provided a
counterexample.
13The ratio Ev(k)=Ev depends both on the variance of G(v) and on the mean. A power
distribution con￿ates the two, since both depend on b. (The variance equals b=[(1+b)2(2+b)]
with a maximum at b = 0:62). A beta distribution is more ￿exible and isolates the two e⁄ects,
125 Heterogeneous distributions
The assumption that valuations are identically distributed over all proposals is,
in general, unrealistic: many issues put to referendum are typically of interest
only to a small minority￿ the calendar of the hunting season, the decision to
grant landmark status to a building, the details of government procedures￿
while some on the contrary evoke strong feelings from most voters￿ divorce
in Italy, a¢ rmative action and taxation in California, equal rights for women
in Switzerland.14 Allowing for di⁄erent distributions makes the problem less
transparent, but does not change its logic and in fact increases the expected
dispersion in valuations that makes the voting scheme valuable.
The ￿rst step is the characterization of the equilibrium￿ the choice of the
referendum on which to cast the bonus vote. Lemmas 1 to 3 continue to apply,
but now voters￿bonus votes will not be spread equally over all referenda￿ the
more salient issues will receive a larger share of bonus votes. In equilibrium,
















When Gr(v) = Gs(v) 8r;s, as in the previous section, (11) and (12) simplify to
￿r = 1=k and ￿sr = 1. This is not the case now.
The equilibrium remains unique15 but is less intuitive than in the case of
identical distributions: if a referendum evokes more intense preferences and
more voters are expected to cast their bonus vote on that issue, then the impact
of the bonus vote will be higher elsewhere. It may be referable to cast one￿ s
bonus vote in a di⁄erent referendum, even if the valuation is slightly lower. For
example, in the case of 2 referenda and power distributions, suppose b1 = 1 and
b2 = 2. Then ￿12 = 0:89￿ a voter casts the bonus vote on issue 1 as long as
but does not provide a closed form solution for the kth order statistics. We can nevertheless
check conditions (8) or (10) numerically. Suppose for example ￿ = 1=2. Then if E(v) = 1=2,
(10) is satis￿ed for all k as long as the variance is larger than 0:008 (or equivalently as long as
not more than 3=4 of the population are concentrated in the two deciles around the mean).
But if the mean is 3=4, the minimum variance rises to 0:02 (or not more than 50 percent of
the population in the two deciles around the mean); if instead the mean is 1=4, the minimum
variance falls to 0:002 (or not more than 98 percent of the population in the two deciles around
the mean). The necessary ￿oor on the variance rises as the mean increases.
14The distinction is equivalent to Matsusaka￿ s (1992) empirical classi￿cation of initiatives
into "e¢ ciency" (low salience) and "distributional" (high salience).
15Consider an equilibrium f￿
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z establishing a contradiction. Reversing the signs, the identical argument can be used





13v1 ￿ 0:89 v2￿ and the expected shares of bonus votes cast on the two referenda
are ￿1 = 0:41 and ￿2 = 0:59. If b2 = 4, the numbers become ￿12 = 0:82,
￿1 = 0:34 and ￿2 = 0:66.
The condition for e¢ ciency gains over simple majority again follows the logic
described earlier, but is made less transparent by the need to account for the
di⁄erent distributions and for the factors of proportionality ￿rs:



























Condition (13) is analogous to (10), but because the parameters ￿r and ￿sr
di⁄er across distributions and ￿sr in general di⁄ers from 1, it does not reduce
to a simple condition on the ratio of the expected highest valuation draw to the
mean valuation. Nevertheless, it remains possible to state:
Proposition 3. For any set of distributions fGr(v)g symmetric around
zero and with full support and for any number of referenda k > 1, there exists
a e ￿ > 0 such that ! > 1 for all ￿ < e ￿.
The proposition is proved in the Appendix. It states that the result we
had previously established in the case of identical distributions is in fact more
general, and continues to apply with heterogeneous distributions.
In practical applications, two concerns remain. The ￿rst is that calculating
the correct equilibrium factors of proportionality ￿rs is not easy. How well
would voters fare if they followed the plausible rule of thumb of casting the
bonus vote on the highest valuation proposal? It seems wise to make sure that
the desirable properties of the mechanism are robust to the most likely o⁄-
equilibrium behavior. In fact, Proposition 3 extends immediately to this case:
Proposition 3b. Suppose voters set ￿sr = 1 8s;r. Proposition 3 continues
to hold. (See the Appendix).
The second concern was voiced earlier. If the planner is not fully informed
on the shape of the distributions, or if the value of ￿ is to be chosen once and for
all, for example in a constitutional setting, can we identify su¢ cient conditions
on ￿ that ensure e¢ ciency gains for a large range of distributions? The answer
is complicated by the factors ￿rs and thus by the lack of a simple closed-form
solution even when we specialize the distributions to simple functional forms.
However, in our reference example of power distributions and in the "rule-of-
thumb" case where voters cast the bonus vote on the highest valuation proposal,
we obtain an interesting result:
Example 2. Suppose Gr(v) = vbr, br > 0 8r; and set ￿sr = 1 8s;r. Call
bk ￿ maxfbrg. Then for all k > 1, ! > 1 if ￿ ￿ 1=bk.
14The example is proved in the Appendix. As in the case of identical distri-
butions, we can derive a simple su¢ cient condition ensuring welfare gains: the
value of the bonus vote can be safely set on the basis of the distribution of val-
uations in the most strongly felt of the issues under consideration. If we return
to our previous discussion and partition the support of the valuations into four
equal size intervals, setting ￿ = 1=4 or 1/5 would seem a reasonably prudent
policy.16 Intuitively, we expect the condition to be stronger than needed: the
heterogeneity of the distributions should help in providing the spread in ex-
pected valuations that underlies the voting scheme￿ s e¢ ciency gains. Indeed, in
all our numerical exercises with power distributions we achieved welfare gains by
setting ￿ ￿ k=
Pk
r=1 br, the inverse of the mean b parameter, a looser constraint
than 1=bk.17
This section allows us to conclude that the properties of the voting scheme,
so transparent in the simple case of identical distributions, extend to the more
plausible scenario of heterogeneous distributions. Having established our result
in the most intuitive settings, we can now address two questions that seems
particularly natural.
6 Why discrete bonus votes?
The equivalence between granting voters a single bonus vote or multiple extra
votes is driven by the discreteness we have attributed to the votes. Why not
consider instead a continuous bonus vote that voters can split as they see ￿t
between the di⁄erent issues? The scheme is intuitive and more general than the
one we have considered so far; indeed, from a theoretical point of view, it is a
more natural starting point. There is also reason to expect that the general-
ization could help. We saw that in the discrete scheme the value of the bonus
vote has to be tuned correctly: when the dispersion in valuations is small, the
bonus vote runs the risk of being too blunt an instrument to ￿nely di⁄erentiate
between them. Why not let voters do the ￿ne-tuning themselves, choosing the
extent to which they want to divide their extra vote over the di⁄erent issues?
We show in this section that although some theoretical improvement over the
discrete scheme is possible, some complications arise. In our opinion, the bal-
ance of the arguments comes down in favor of the discrete bonus vote we have
described so far.
The main points will be clearer in the simplest setting, and in what follows we
assume that there are only two proposals (k = 2), the distributions of valuations
are identical over both proposals (Gr(v) = G(v), r = 1;2), and the value of
the continuous bonus vote ￿ is set to 1.18 Call xi 2 [0;1] the fraction of the
16With b = 5, more than 3/4 of all voters consider the issue "very important," 97 per-
cent consider it either "important" or "very important," and less than 1 in a thousand "not
important."
17This was true whether we looked at the equilibrium or at the ￿sr = 1 case. With k = 2,
e¢ ciency gains in the "rule-of-thumb" scenario are su¢ cient for e¢ ciency gains in equilibrium,
but not with k > 2.
18The analysis extends immediately to ￿ < 1. If ￿ > 1, the logic is unchanged but the
15bonus vote cast by voter i on the issue with highest valuation. Thus i will
cast (1 + xi) votes in one referendum and (2 ￿ xi) in the other. We continue
to focus on equilibria in undominated strategies where each voter conditions
his or her voting strategy on a positive probability of being pivotal in both
issues. Hence all the previous arguments continue to apply and we can restrict
candidate equilibria to symmetrical scenarios where strategies are contingent on
absolute valuations and the distribution of the vote di⁄erential19 faced by voter
i is identical in both referenda. Denoting by ￿i the choices of the other voters,







Labeling v1i the higher valuation, the expected utility of voter i after valu-
ations are drawn is given by
Eui = v1i￿
￿















for example, is the probability that i￿ s preferred outcome in referendum 1 is






￿ 1=2). Before proceeding further, notice that there is
always an equilibrium where no-one splits the bonus vote. If none of the other
voters splits a bonus vote, the distribution of the vote di⁄erential faced by voter











2 (0;1), and the only relevant choices are xi = 0 or xi = 1. The analysis in the
￿rst part of this paper remains the correct analysis here, and the equilibrium
with discrete voting identi￿ed there remains an equilibrium here.21 Thus the
￿rst observation is that allowing the bonus vote to be divisible must always
increase the number of equilibria.
Consider now a candidate equilibrium where x￿i is continuous over the whole
interval [0;1]. The distribution of the vote di⁄erential is then continuous and














i 2 [0;1]; (15)
equations need to be amended.
19The vote di⁄erential faced by i is the net sum of all votes cast by the other voters, where
votes against the proposal are counted as negative votes.
20In equilibrium, in either referendum half of the voters vote ￿(1+x￿i) and the remainder
￿(2 ￿ x￿i):
￿2 = n[(1=2)E(1 + x￿i)2 + (1=2)E(2 ￿ x￿i)2]
21The logic extends immediately to all other possible discrete jumps in the proportion of
the bonus vote cast in the two referenda. But then we revert to the case of discrete votes, and
to the result reached earlier: the bonus vote should be cumulated on the one most important
issue. In equilibrium the only relevant case is then the 0 ￿ 1 split.
16where the star indicates xi￿ s optimal value and ’(￿) is the normal density func-









Taking into account x￿






























￿i) log(v1i=v2i) if log(v1i=v2i) 2 [0;t(n;x￿
￿i)]











The main observation can be made without an explicit solution for x￿ and
is in fact immediate: for large n the option of splitting the bonus vote becomes
irrelevant. The reason is that t(n;x￿
￿i), the upper boundary on the logarithm
of relative valuations consistent with splitting the bonus vote, approaches zero
at rate n. Since v1i > v2i by de￿nition, the probability of splitting the bonus
vote approaches zero at rate n.
To gain a more precise sense of what this means, suppose that G(v) is a
uniform distribution. In the interval where the bonus vote is split, log(v1=v2) is
of order O(n￿1) and thus, ignoring terms of order O(n￿2), can be approximated
by (v1=v2) ￿ 1. Call ￿ the share of the population that splits the bonus vote,
or equivalently the probability of splitting one￿ s vote (where, with a uniform
distribution, ￿ = t). In a symmetrical equilibrium with n = 100, ￿ = 0:006;
with n = 1;000, ￿ = 0:0006￿ as we increase the order of magnitude of the
population, the number of voters expected to split their vote remains less than
a single one.22 The same result can be stated in terms of welfare: with n = 100,
the equilibrium with continuous voting slightly improves our measure of welfare;
but for all n ￿ 1;000 the precision of our numerical simulations is not su¢ cient
to detect any di⁄erence.23
Summarizing, we have reached two conclusions. First, the equilibrium where
the bonus vote is not split continues to exist when the bonus vote is perfectly
divisible￿ moving from discrete bonus votes to a continuum increases the num-
ber of equilibria. Second, the distinction becomes irrelevant in large populations,
22The product ￿n is approximately constant because t approaches 3=(5n); since ￿ equals t,
￿n must be approximately 3=5 = 0:6.
23With G(v) uniform, k = 2, ￿ = 1 and one indivisible bonus vote, ! = 1:054 8n. In the
symmetrical equilibrium with continuous splitting, !C = 1:055 if n = 100, but !C = 1:054
8n ￿ 1;000.
17both in terms of the proportion of voters who exploit it in equilibrium and in
terms of its welfare consequences.24
7 Bonus votes or partial votes?
Nothing in the logic of our scheme requires ￿ to be positive, an assumption we
have maintained so far. A negative ￿ corresponds to granting voters a "partial
vote," a vote worth less than the others, and voters can select the issue on which
they would then "partially abstain." The idea is not new: if granting bonus votes
is similar to cumulative voting in multi-candidate elections, a partial vote recalls
limited voting, a voting system advocated and adopted with some frequency as
a simpler alternative to cumulative voting. Limited voting amounts to granting
voters fewer votes than the number of seats to be ￿lled, without allowing voters
to cumulate the votes.25 In this section, we study the properties of the voting
mechanism if ￿ < 0.
To keep the comparison to bonus votes straightforward, we limit ourselves
to the case where ￿ 2 (￿1;0): as in the rest of the paper, voters will select
a single referendum on which to cast their modi￿ed (here, partial) vote. As
￿ approaches ￿1, the partial vote approaches full abstention, and voters are
endowed with one fewer vote than the number of referenda.26 Because the only
relevant variable is the value of the partial vote relative to the regular votes, the
￿rst observation is that a partial vote or a bonus vote mechanism are identical
when k = 2. If the number of referenda on the ballot is larger than 2, on the
other hand, in general the two schemes will di⁄er.
Suppose, for simplicity that all distributions of valuations are identical (Gr(v) =
G(v), r = 1;2;:::;k). The logic followed in the case of a bonus vote continues to
apply, establishing that there is a unique equilibrium where all voters cast their
partial vote in the referendum with lowest valuation.27 The welfare criterion
!, the percentage increase in ex ante utility relative to simple majority voting,
24Notice a corollary to the last observation: in large populations, a continuous bonus vote
cannot be used to guarantee welfare gains, relative to simple majority referenda, if the value
of the bonus vote is not chosen correctly.
25The argument is that limited voting is strategically more straightforward than cumulative
voting. See the discussion in Issacharo⁄, Karlan and Pildes (2001), chapter 13.
26Given that every voter has one regular vote in each referendum, by imposing the constraint
￿ ￿ ￿1, we are excluding negative (total) votes.

















2￿n(k + ￿2 + 2￿)
:
Because ￿ < 0, the probability of winning is smaller in the referendum where the partial vote
is cast, and the variance of the vote di⁄erential is smaller than with bonus votes or with simple
majority voting.








where the superscript P stands for partial vote, Ev(1) is the expected value of
the lowest valuation and ￿ is negative.
It remains true that there always exists a value of ￿ 2 (￿1;0) for which !P
is larger than 1. From (17), !P > 1 requires
j￿j <
2kEv(Ev ￿ Ev(1))
k(Ev)2 ￿ (Ev(1))2 :






How do the partial vote and the bonus vote schemes compare with one









(k ￿ 1)(Ev)2 :
Hence




Not surprisingly, the answer depends on the distribution: if the midrange￿
the arithmetic mean of the expected highest and lowest draws￿ is higher than
the mean, the bonus vote scheme is preferable; if the opposite holds, the par-
tial vote yields higher gains. Thus the two schemes are identical if k = 2, as
mentioned above, or if the distribution of valuations is symmetric around a 0:5
mean (for example in the case of a uniform). If the distribution is not symmet-
ric, then the comparison depends on the shape of the distribution. For example,
if G(v) = vb, !￿ > !P￿ , b < 1.28 If preferences are polarized and the mean
intensity is high, the wedge between the mean and the highest valuation is ex-
pected to be relatively small￿ if there is an outlier it is more likely to be on
the low side, the one referendum over which preferences are weak, and a partial
vote scheme is preferable. But if preferences are not very polarized, then the
possible outlier is expected to be on the high side, and a bonus vote scheme is
preferable.
It is not di¢ cult to generalize the results of this paper to include the option






19practical reasons: the bonus vote scheme is simply easier to design. In both
cases, the only variable that matters is the relative value of the "special" vote,
but while that is seen immediately when ￿ > 0, it is less transparent with ￿ < 0.
For example, granting voters one fewer vote than the number of issues may seem
somewhat equivalent, in practice, to granting one more vote. In fact, the ￿rst
option corresponds to an extreme choice while the second does not, and the ￿rst
will thus be appropriate in a much more restricted set of circumstances.
We turn now to the robustness of our conclusions if we relax one important
assumption maintained so far: the symmetry of the distributions of valuations.
8 Asymmetrical distributions of valuations
The assumption that the distributions of valuations, though possibly di⁄erent
for di⁄erent issues, are all symmetrical around 0 implies that in any referendum
there is no systematic di⁄erence in the distribution of valuations between voters
who oppose the proposal and voters who favor it. The assumption is standard
in the literature, but how important is it for our results? Intuitively we expect
that asymmetries should make the bonus vote mechanism more valuable: its
role is to give weight to di⁄erences in intensities that majority voting cannot
capture, and thus it is precisely when intensities on the two sides of an issue
di⁄er that bonus votes should matter most.
When the distributions of valuations are symmetric and the value of the
bonus vote is chosen correctly, the bonus vote mechanism yields e¢ ciency gains
over majority voting, always improving over randomness more than majority
voting does. However, we have also remarked that the absolute di⁄erence in ex
ante e¢ ciency between the two voting mechanisms converges to zero asymptoti-
cally, as the population grows without bound. As noted earlier, the convergence
of the two mechanisms in the symmetric case is implied by the result in Ledyard
and Palfrey (2002) establishing the asymptotic optimality of referenda when the
threshold for approval is chosen correctly.29 Exploiting the dominant nature of
sincere voting in referenda, Ledyard and Palfrey de￿ne the optimal threshold by
the requirement that the mean sample valuation when the threshold is exactly
reached should equal zero (in our setting). Because the sample mean converges
to the distribution￿ s mean as the size of the electorate grows without bound,
this condition ensures that the proposal passes only if the mean valuation is
positive, as e¢ ciency demands. When the distribution of valuations is sym-
metric around zero, the optimal threshold is 50 percent, the simple majority
requirement (hence also the asymptotic optimality of randomness in this case).
But if the distribution of valuations is not symmetric, and in particular if the
mean and the median valuations di⁄er in sign, the optimal threshold is not 50
percent, and a simple majority referendum does not yield the optimal decision
(and neither of course does randomness) even in the limit. Bonus votes, on
the other hand, are designed to give weight to intensity of preferences￿ i.e. to
29Ledyard and Palfrey establish the convergence of the optimal referendum to the interim
e¢ cient mechanism in a model of public good provision that includes our set-up.
20re￿ ect the mean valuation more than the median. If they do so successfully, the
absolute di⁄erence in ex ante utility from the two voting systems will remain
bounded away from zero as the size of the electorate grows without bound.30
To study the problem in the simplest setting, suppose that the distributions
of valuations are identical over all proposals, but now for each proposal call
P(v) the distribution of valuations of voters in favor, and C(v) the distribution
of valuations of voters against the proposal (where both distributions can be
stated in terms of absolute valuations). In line with the reading of the empirical
evidence in the literature31 and with the model so far, suppose that the median
of the distribution remains at 0: assume that both P(v) and C(v) have full
support [0;1] and that P(1) = C(1). But the two distributions have di⁄erent
means: for concreteness, suppose EP(v) > EC(v), implying that in each ref-
erendum the mean valuation over the whole electorate is positive. We assign
the higher mean valuation to the "pro" side with no loss of generality￿ which
side has higher mean is irrelevant and we could trivially generalize the model
to allow the side with higher mean to change across proposals. The important
point is that in each referendum the mean valuation over the whole electorate
di⁄ers from 0 while the median equals 0. All valuations are independent, across
voters and proposals.
We begin by characterizing equilibrium strategies. The following Lemma is
proved in the Appendix:
Lemma 5. If Pr(v) = P(v) 8r and Cr(v) = C(v) 8r, then there exists a
unique equilibrium where each voter casts a bonus vote in referendum s if and
only if vis ￿ vir 8r.
The equilibrium is pinned down by the requirement that the impact of the
bonus vote is equalized across referenda. In practice, if the asymmetry in the
distributions is not trivial the equilibrium probability of being pivotal is neg-
ligible in all referenda, and it is the simplicity of the strategy, more than the
in￿nitesimal loss that a deviating voter would incur, that recommends focussing
on it. Once again, casting the bonus vote on the highest valuation is both the
equilibrium strategy and the most plausible heuristic rule for the voters. We
can then establish:
Proposition 5. If P(v) ￿rst-order stochastically dominates C(v), then the
bonus votes mechanism improves e¢ ciency over majority voting for any ￿ > 0.
(The proof is in the Appendix).
The intuition behind the proposition is that, with ￿rst-order stochastic dom-
inance, the probability mass of favorable valuations is concentrated towards
higher values than is the case for negative valuations. By Lemma 5, bonus
30The principle discussed by Ledyard and Palfrey identi￿es the optimal threshold for ref-
erenda with any distribution. Because in practice most referenda are decided according to
simple majority, it is this case that we consider for comparison in this paper.
31Studying all ballot propositions in California in the period 1912-89, Matsusaka (1992)
identi￿es equally split electorates as the de￿ning empirical regularity of proposals subject to
popular vote (as opposed to being decided by the legislature).
21votes are then correspondingly concentrated on favorable votes. The probabil-
ity that a referendum passes given that the mean valuation is positive converges
asymptotically to 1 for any positive value of the bonus vote, as opposed to ap-
proaching 1=2 in the case of simple majority. First-order stochastic dominance
guarantees that, as conjectured above, bonus votes shift the outcome in the
direction of the mean, and hence increase e¢ ciency.
Consider then a sequence of bonus votes referenda indexed by the size of
the population n, and similarly index our welfare criteria. As shown in the
Appendix, the following result also holds:
Corollary. If P(v) ￿rst-order stochastically dominates C(v), then as n !
1, EUn=EWn ! 1 + [EP(v) ￿ EC(v)]=[EP(v) + EC(v)] > 1, and !n ! 1 for
any ￿ > 0.
In words, as the size of the population appraoches in￿nity, majority voting
approaches randomness, but bonus votes do not, and the di⁄erence in ex ante
utility between the two voting mechanisms does not disappear, in fact, relative
to randomenss the welfare gain associated with bonus votes grows arbitrarily
large.
First-order stochastic dominance is satis￿ed by the power distribution we
have used as recurring example:
Example 3. Suppose that both P(v) and C(v) are power distributions with
parameters bp and bc, where bp > bc. Then for any ￿ > 0 and n large, ! > 1
and as n ! 1, !n ! 1:
To see what ￿rst-order stochastic dominance implies in practice, suppose
once again that the public￿ s intensity of preferences at best can be identi￿ed
through a partition of the support of (absolute) valuations into four equally
sized intervals. Consider a referendum where proponents on average have more
intense preferences than opponents. First-order stochastic dominance requires
some monotonicity in the manner in which voters on the two sides are distributed
in the four intervals. Among those judging the proposal "very important" most
should be proponents, and similarly among those considering it either "very
important" or "important"; among those judging the proposal "not important"
most should be opponents, and similarly among those considering it either "not
important" or "somewhat important" (see for example Figure 1). In practice,
the requirement may be not too restrictive.
But ￿rst-order stochastic dominance is stronger than needed￿ it is a su¢ -
cient condition for welfare gains from bonus votes, but not a necessary one. Con-





0 xaC￿1(1 ￿ x)bC￿1=Beta[aC;bC], and suppose EP(v) > EC(v) in
each referendum. Call ￿P (￿C) the expected fraction of voters casting their
bonus vote in favor of (against) any given proposal. Figure 2 shows the ratio
￿P=￿C when aP=bP = 2, aC=bC = 1, bP 2 [1=2;5], and bC 2 [1=2;5]. Since
E(v) = a=(a+b), the constraints aP=bP = 2 and aC=bC = 1 imply EP(v) = 2=3
and EC(v) = 1=2 (or EP(v)=EC(v) = 4=3), while the range in the parameters
bP and bC allows us to change the shape of the distributions from bimodal at
220 and 1 (when b < 1) to uniform (b = 1) to unimodal (when b > 1). If ￿P=￿C
is larger than 1, then the probability that the given referendum will pass con-
verges to 1, as demanded by e¢ ciency. In Figure 2.a k = 2, and ￿P=￿C is
always larger than 1, although P(v) and C(v) cannot in general be ranked in
terms of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance.
It is also true however that in the absence of stochastic dominance bonus
votes need not improve welfare.32 The problematic cases are those where the
side with higher mean is concentrated in its valuation, while the opposite side is
dispersed (particularly so if it is bimodal at 0 and 1). With probability increasing
in k, the number of referenda, it is then possible for the bonus votes to be used
predominantly by the side with lower mean valuation (the larger the number
of draws, the higher the probability that the highest draw will come from the
more dispersed distribution). In our beta-distribution example, for some of our
parameter values ￿P=￿C falls below 1 if we increase k to 4 (see the upper left
corner of Figure 2.b). Even though P(v) has higher mean, a referendum may
fail to pass if P(v) is very concentrated around its mode (bP is high), while C(v)
is not (bC is low). But as the ￿gure shows, the range of parameter values for
which this occurs is small.33 Intuition suggests that it should be smaller still if
the distributions di⁄er across referenda.
￿P=￿C:
Beta distributions: EP(v) = 2=3; EC(v) = 1=2;
bP 2 [0:5;5], bC 2 [0:5;5];
1 2 3 4 5








Figure 2.a: k = 2
1 2 3 4 5








Figure 2.b: k = 4
32Bonus votes are not a fully e¢ cient mechanism, even asymptotically.
33With k = 4 the upper bound on bC for which problems can occur is 0:7, and this requires
bP ￿ 5. There is a trade-o⁄ involved in the choice of k: the higher is k the larger is (EU￿EW)
if ￿P=￿C > 1; but if P(v) does not ￿rst-order stochastically dominate C(v), the lower is k,
the smaller the range of distributions for which ￿P=￿C < 1. Thus the optimal k depends on
the precision of the information on the shape of the distributions.
239 Conclusions
This paper has discussed an easy scheme to improve the e¢ ciency of referenda:
when several referenda are held simultaneously, grant voters, in addition to their
regular votes, a stock of special votes￿ or even more simply a single special
vote￿ that can be allocated freely among the di⁄erent referenda. By concen-
trating these bonus votes on the one issue to which each voter attaches most
importance, voters can shift the probability of obtaining the outcome they prefer
towards the issue they care most about. If the value of the bonus votes is chosen
correctly, and in particular if it is positive but not too large, the result is an
increase in ex ante utility, relative to simple majority voting. If we use random
decision-making as a natural lower bound against which the voting mechanisms
are evaluated, then when the distributions of valuations are symmetric between
voters who favor and voters who oppose each proposal, bonus votes (of the
correct value) always improve over randomness by more than majority voting
does. The analysis can be generalized easily to bonus votes of negative value
(allowing voters to cast "partial" or weaker votes) or to a continuous, perfectly
divisible bonus vote that voters can divide freely over the multiple proposals,
but we argue in the paper that the more general, more complex schemes need
not be preferable.
The symmetry assumption is strong and, although standard in the literature,
has special implications: in particular, as the population approaches in￿nity,
random decision-making, majority voting and bonus votes are all asymptoti-
cally e¢ cient. In the ￿nal section of the paper we have extended the analysis
to asymmetrical distributions, and in particular to situations where the popula-
tion is equally split between voters favoring or opposing any proposal, but the
mean intensity of preferences is higher on one side. In this case, bonus votes
are guaranteed to increase ex ante utility if the distribution of valuations on the
side with higher mean ￿rst-order stochastically dominates the distribution on
the opposite side; that is, if the mass of voters with more intense preferences is
larger on the side with higher mean. If this condition is satis￿ed, bonus votes in-
duce a welfare gain over simple majority regardless of their exact value, and the
improvement does not disappear asymptotically (whereas majority voting con-
tinues to approach random decision-making). If this su¢ cient condition is not
satis￿ed, counterexamples exist, but expecially when the number of referenda
is small, constructing them requires some ingenuity.
Bonus votes are a simple mechanism allowing some expression of voters￿in-
tensity of preferences. They recall cumulative voting￿ an existing voting scheme
employed in multi-candidate elections with the expressed goal of protecting mi-
nority interests. The protection of minorities built into these mechanisms is
a particularly important objective as recourse to direct democracy increases.
In fact the need to safeguard minorities, and in particular minorities with lit-
tle access to ￿nancial resources, is the single point of agreement in the often
heated debate on initiatives and referenda (for example Matsusaka (2004) and
24Gerber (1999)).34 The important objective is designing voting mechanisms that
increase minority representation without aggregate e¢ ciency losses, and this is
why in this paper we have insisted on the pure e¢ ciency properties of bonus
votes.35
There is one open question that the paper has not addressed: the composi-
tion of the agenda. In our analysis, the slate of referenda is exogeneous, and in
particular is not a⁄ected by the voting system. We believe this is the correct
starting point, and one that allows us to begin by assuming the independence
of individual valuations. Modeling any agenda-formation process is famously
controversial, and in our case in addition requires identifying speci￿c (large)
groups with common interests, taking a stance on the forces holding the groups
together and on the correlations of the group members valuations across di⁄er-
ent issues. From a technical point of view, it implies renouncing the assumption
of independence and thus the power of the limit theorems we have exploited
repeatedly. Intuitively, the ￿nal outcome seems di¢ cult to predict: bonus votes
may increase the incentive to manipulate the agenda, but also the ability to
nullify the manipulation. We leave serious work on this question for the future.
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2611 Appendix
Before proving the lemmas in the text, we begin by a preliminary result that will
be used repeatedly. De￿ne votes in favor as positive votes and votes against as
negative votes, and the vote di⁄erential, the sum of all votes cast in referendum
r, as Vr.
Lemma A.1. Consider the voting problem in the absence of bonus votes
when everybody votes sincerely. Call pr a voter￿ s probability of obtaining the
desired outcome in referendum r. Then if Fr(v) is symmetric around 0, Vr ￿
N(0;n) and pr ’ 1=2 + 1=
p
2￿n.
Proof of Lemma A.1. The derivation of the asymptotic distribution of
the vote di⁄erential is standard (see for example Feller, 1968, pp. 179 -182).
The distribution is normal with mean given by the sample mean (1=2(￿1) +
1=2(1) = 0) and variance given by the sum of the variances of the summands:
n[(1=2)(￿1)2 + (1=2)(1)2] = n. Because the distribution does not depend on
Fr(v), we can ignore the subscript r. Taking into account possible ties, the
probability of obtaining one￿ s desired outcome is:
p = prob(Vi ￿ 0) + (1=2)prob(Vi = 1)
where Vi is the voting di⁄erential excluding voter i. Given the discreteness of
the votes:




















































Given n large and ignoring terms of order O(n￿3=2), p ￿ 1=2 + 1=
p
2￿n. ￿
We can now begin to study our model, where voters cast both regular and
bonus votes.
Proof of Lemma 1. When we add to the problem bonus votes of arbitrary
value, we need to be more careful about the discreteness of the asymptotic
distribution of the vote di⁄erential. The subtlety is in sizing correctly the steps
of the distribution. The proof proceeds in three stages. First, we present the
local limit theorem relevant to our problem. Then we show that casting bonus
votes in a referendum where the expected value of the vote di⁄erential is non-
zero cannot a⁄ect the probability of being pivotal. Finally we show that this
argument implies Lemma 1.
27(i). Consider the problem facing voter i in referendum r when bonus votes
are available. The voter has to evaluate the probability of obtaining his or
her desired outcome when casting xi votes, where xi equals ￿1 if i casts no
bonus votes and ￿(1+z#) if he or she casts z bonus votes. All voters have the
same set of feasible options X = fxjg = f￿(1 + z#), z = 0;1;:::;mg (where
j indexes any point in the support that has positive probability). If voters use
symmetric strategies, xi is iid for all i￿ s, we can drop the subscript i and use
local limit theorems to characterize the asymptotic distribution of the votes
di⁄erential in any referendum. The random variable x is distributed according
to a lattice distribution￿ a discrete distribution such that all possible xj 2 X
can be expressed as a + sjh with h > 0 and sj integer 8j. We need to impose
the correct normalization. Following Gnedenko local limit theorem (Gnedenko
and Kolmogorov, 1968, ch.9), select the representation xj = a + sjh0 such that
h0 is the largest common divisor of all possible pairwise di⁄erences xj ￿xj0, and
consider the normalized random variable x0 ￿ (x ￿ a)=h0 and the normalized




i. If x0 has ￿nite mean E(x0) and non-zero variance ￿2
x0, then:









] as n ! 1
For our purposes, we need to consider two cases. If # ￿ 1, no normalization is
required; if # = 1=C with C discrete and larger than 1, normalize the problem so
that all x are set in terms of the smallest possible integers: set h0 = 1=C and a =
0, and thus X0 = f￿(C+m);:::;￿(C+1);￿C;C;(C+1);:::;(C+m)g: In both
cases, call ￿￿ the normalized value of the regular vote, and ￿￿ the normalized
value of one bonus vote. In addition, de￿ne as ￿x0r the probability that any
voter casts x0 votes in referendum r, again distinguishing between positive and
negative votes, Er(x0) ￿ ￿r =
P
x02X0 ￿x0rx0 and ￿2
r =
P
x02X0 ￿x0r(x0 ￿ ￿r)2.
(ii) Suppose i opposes the proposal. The probability that i obtains the
desired outcome when voting ￿￿, p￿￿r, equals:
p￿￿r = prob(V 0
ir < ￿) + (1=2)prob(V 0
ir = ￿)
The corresponding probability when adding z￿ bonus votes equals
p￿z￿r = prob(V 0
ir < ￿ + z￿) + (1=2)prob(V 0
ir = ￿ + z￿)
Thus
p￿z￿r￿p￿￿r = (1=2)[prob(V 0
ir = ￿)+prob(V 0
ir = ￿+z￿)]+prob(V 0
ir 2 (￿;￿+z￿))



































28But recall E(V 0




n) approaches 0, we
conclude:
p￿z￿r ￿ p￿￿r < O(e￿n) if ￿r 6= 0
The conclusion is identical if i favors the proposal, and thus casting bonus votes
cannot increase the probability of being pivotal (up to an approximation smaller
than O(e￿n)) in referenda where the votes di⁄erential has non-zero mean.
(iii) Consider a candidate equilibrium where there exist some r, r0 such
that E(V 0
r) = 0, E(V 0
r0) 6= 0. By Lemma A.2 no voter casts any bonus vote in
referenda r0. With F(v) symmetric around 0 and undominated strategies - hence
sincere voters￿ the scenario cannot occur: either E(V 0
r) = 0 8r, or E(V 0
r) 6= 0 8r.
Suppose then E(V 0
r) 6= 0 8r. By Lemma A.2, p￿z￿r ￿ p￿￿r < O(e￿n) 8r, 8z,
regardless of the sign of E(V 0
r). By selecting weakly undominated strategies,
voters vote as if p￿z￿r ￿ p￿￿r > 0 8r, or as if E(V 0
r) = 0 8r, which implies
p￿z￿r ￿ p￿￿r = pz￿r ￿ p￿r. But then the sign of v cannot matter: with payo⁄
v ￿ jvj and p￿z￿r ￿ p￿￿r = pz￿r ￿ p￿r all weakly undominated strategies must
depend only on v. But then with F(v) is symmetric around 0, E(V 0
r) 6= 0
8r cannot occur. We are left with the case E(V 0
r) = 0 8r. By Gnedenko￿ s
theorem, and exploiting the approximation Exp[y=n] ’ 1￿y=n, the probability











up to terms of order O(n￿3=2), whether the votes are for or against. (The
normalization discussed earlier is important. (A.1) is derived separately for the
two cases that are relevant for the model: ￿ = ￿ = 1 and ￿ = C > 1, ￿ = 1).
Once again, with payo⁄ v ￿ jvj and pjx0jr independent of the sign of the vote,
the optimal jx0
rj must depend on v only. Since jx0
rj is just a normalization of
jxrj, the conclusion applies to jxrj too and Lemma 1 is established. ￿ The
following Corollary follows immediately from the proof:
Corollary to Lemma 1. If F(v) is symmetric around 0, in all undomi-
nated strategies equilibria E(V 0
r) = 0 8r.
Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that we now understand the strategies x0
ir(vir;m;#;Fr)
to refer to the absolute number of votes cast. Consider the problem faced by




















Problem (A2) is linear in zr, and the solution must be at a corner: voter i











x02X0 ￿x0r(x0 ￿ ￿r)2 and is taken as given by i.) ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. We begin by establishing one preliminary result.
Lemma A.2. In equilibrium, ￿r < 1 8r.
Proof of Lemma A.2. Suppose that there exists a r0 such that ￿r0 = 1, and
consider voter i￿s problem. If i casts his bonus vote on r0, then p￿r = pm￿r0 ’
1=2 + 1=
p
2￿n 8r. If i shifts the bonus vote to s, p￿r0 ’ 1=2 + 1=(2
p
2￿n)





2￿n)(1 + d) where d is the largest positive integer smaller or
equal to than m￿=￿, if one exists, or 0. Thus voter i￿ s expected utility would
increase by: 1=(2
p
2￿n)[(1+d)vis￿vir0] > 0 8vis > vir0=(1+d). The probability
that i ￿nds it pro￿table to deviate is the probability that there exists at least one



















> 0 (in fact arbitrarily close to 1 for n large
enough). ￿
We can now return to Lemma 3. By Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma A.2,
E(V 0
r) = 0 8r and n￿2
r = n[￿r(￿+m￿)2+(1￿￿r)￿2] = n[￿2+￿r(2￿m￿+(m￿)2)],














2￿n[￿2 + ￿r(2￿m￿ + (m￿)2)]


















The second part of the Lemma is proved in the text. ￿:
Proof of Proposition 3. At ￿ = 0, ! = 1￿ as must be the case by the
de￿nition of ! and as can be veri￿ed by setting ￿ = 0 in (13). Proposition 3 must
hold if ! is increasing in ￿ at ￿ = 0: although ￿ must be a rational number larger
than 1=
p
n, there is always a value of n such that ￿ can take values arbitrarily
close to 0. Because in addition ! is continuous in ￿ in the neighborhood of
30￿ = 0, in this neighborhood we can treat ￿ as a continuous variable. Showing
d!=d￿ > 0 at ￿ = 0 amounts to di⁄erentiating (13), taking into account (11)
and (12). The derivative is greatly simpli￿ed by being evaluated at ￿ = 0. In
































































where Ev(k) now stands for the expected highest draw over all distributions.











But since ￿rj￿=0 2 (0;1)8r, the expression must be strictly positive, and the
proposition is established.￿
Proof of Proposition 3b. The proof proceed identically to the proof of









, where !R ￿ !(￿sr = 18s;r), (A3)
continues to hold, and the argument is unchanged.￿
Proof of Example 2. Here it turns out to be easier to work with ￿ ￿
1=￿, the value of the regular votes relative to the bonus vote. With power
distributions, the condition ! > 1 then corresponds to:



























br(1 + 2￿) + ￿2
The proof proceeds in three steps. First, we know from the proof of Proposi-
tion 3 that as ￿ approaches in￿nity, or equivalently ￿ approaches 0, ! approaches
1 from above. This immediately establishes that either ! > 1 8￿, or there exists
at least one internal maximum at a ￿nite value of ￿. Second, we can derive
the ￿rst-order condition that an internal maximum, if it exists, must satisfy.
Di⁄erentiating the left-hand side of (A4) with respect to ￿, we ￿nd that the






















j=1 bj￿￿2 + br(1 + 2￿￿)
!3=23
5:
For our purposes, the important point is that any and all ￿￿must be a





8 r = 1;:::;k and such that
Pk
r=1 wr(￿￿) = 1. In par-
ticular, notice that each weight is strictly between 0 and 1 for all positive ￿nite
br and ￿￿ (including the limit as ￿￿ approaches 0). Thus any and all ￿￿ must sat-


























The limit is positive and ￿nite. There are two possibilities. If (A6) is smaller
than 1, then by step 1 above an internal maximum must exist. Call ￿￿0 the
largest value of ￿ that satis￿es (A5), and notice that !(￿￿0) must be a maximum:
then ! > 18￿ > ￿￿0. And since ￿￿0 < bk, ! > 1 8￿ ￿ bk: If (A6) is larger than
1, either no internal maximum exists and ! is larger than 1 for all ￿￿ in which
case, ! > 1 8￿ ￿ bk is trivially satis￿ed. Or an internal maximum exists, and
the argument above continues to hold: ! > 18￿ > ￿￿0, and since ￿￿0 < bk, ! > 1
8￿ ￿ bk. Thus in all cases, ! > 1 8￿ ￿ bk or, equivalently, ! > 1 8￿ ￿ 1=bk:￿
Proof of Lemma 5. Call ￿Pr (￿Cr) the share of all voters in favor of
(against) proposal r who choose to cast their bonus vote in referendum r. The





2 + 2￿)(￿Pr + ￿Cr) + 2
￿
. Consider two referenda, s
and r. Voter i casts his or her bonus vote on referendum s over r if vis=vir >






2 + 2￿)(￿Ps + ￿Cs) + 2
(￿

























￿1 if vr > 0
1 if vr < 0
Regardless of the sign of the valuations, the terms in the large parentheses
are always positive. Suppose ￿rst Ar > As. Then for all vis, vir no bonus
32votes should be cast in referendum r, and thus ￿Pr = ￿Cr = 0. But then
Ar = 0 ￿ As, contradicting Ar > As. Thus all equilibria must be such that
Ar = As. One equilibrium is immediate and holds for all distributions P(v)
and C(v): voter i casts his or her bonus vote in referendum s if and only if
vs > vr for all r 6= s, and thus ￿Ps = ￿Pr and ￿Cs = ￿Cr for all r;s. Other
candidate equilibria are possible, but none exists for arbitrary P(v) and C(v)
distributions: for any given pair of distributions, the best response strategies
above yield values for ￿Ps; ￿Pr, ￿Cs, and ￿Cr that are derived independently
of the equilibrium constraint Ar = As and generically violate it. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof proceeds by showing that if P(v)
￿rst-order stochastically dominates C(v) for all r, each referendum passes with
probability approaching 1. With a large population this outcome is ex ante




























































Because both P(v) and C(v) are strictly increasing in v, and P(v) ￿rst-
order stochastically dominates C(v), each term summed in ￿P is larger than
its corresponding term in ￿C, and thus ￿P > ￿C. The vote di⁄erential in each
referendum is normally distributed with mean EV = (n=2)￿(￿P ￿ ￿C) > 0
and variance ￿2
V = (n=2)[(￿P + ￿C)(2￿ + ￿




2 ] when x is large and ￿(￿) is the standard normal distribution
function (see for example Feller, 1968, chapter 7). Hence:





























and the probability that proposal r passes equals
prob(V > 0) +
1
2







Thus a proposal passes with probability approaching 1.







where 1=2 is the ex ante probability of being in favor of any proposal (given the















We can conclude that there always exists a large but ￿nite e n such that for all
n > e n, EU > EW. Notice that the result holds for any positive ￿, independenlty
of its precise value. In addition, if we consider a sequence of referenda with











2EPr(v) yielding the Corollary to Proposition 5 in the text. ￿
34